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                       MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                                                      
                                 
McKEE, Circuit Judge.     
Appellants Russell McMurray, Jr. and Elliot Walsey appeal an order by the 
District Court for the District of New Jersey staying this diversity 
action in favor of 
concurrent litigation that is proceeding in state court in Delaware.  
Appellants rely upon 
Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) 
and its 
progeny in arguing that the district court abused its discretion by 
entering the stay.  For 
the reasons that follow, we will reverse. 
                            I.  Facts 
These consolidated actions arise from an aborted takeover battle between 
Appellees Warner-Lambert Company ("Warner"), and American Home Products 
Corporation ("AHP").   Warner is a Delaware corporation, with its 
principal place of 
business in New Jersey.  It manufactures and sells pharmaceuticals world-
wide.  AHP 
also manufactures pharmaceutical products, and is also a Delaware 
corporation with its 
principal place of business in New Jersey.   
On November 4, 1999, Warner announced an agreement to merge with AHP.  The 
merger was valued at approximately $70 billion.  The merger agreement 
valued each 
share of Warner stock at $83.55.  The combined company was to have 20 
directors, with 
ten coming from Warner and ten from AHP.  Warner's CEO was to be CEO of 
the 
combined company.   AHP's CEO was to be Chairman for 18 months, and was 
then to 
step aside in favor of Warner's CEO.  The merger agreement also contained 
a liquidated 
damage clause or "break-up fee" that required Warner to pay AHP $2 billion 
if Warner 
terminated the agreement. 
The same day the Warner/AHP merger was announced, Pfizer, Inc. another 
major 
manufacturer of pharmaceutical products, disclosed a bid for an 
"unfriendly" takeover of 
Warner.  Pfizer's offer to Warner was for $82.4 billion, and valued Warner 
stock at 
$96.40 per share, or $17.85 more per share than AHP's offer.  Pfizer's 
offer was 
therefore more favorable to Warner shareholders.  Unlike the AHP 
agreement, however, 
the Pfizer offer did not contain a provision for the Warner CEO or Warner 
directors to 
have a position in the company that would have been formed by the merger.  
The Warner/AHP merger agreement lead to a flurry of lawsuits, including 
the one 
before us.  Russell McMurray and Elliot Walsey (collectively, "the 
shareholders") are 
shareholders of Warner.  On November 10, 1999, McMurray filed a 
shareholder class 
action on behalf of Warner shareholders in the District Court for the 
District of New 
Jersey against Warner and AHP.  Shortly thereafter, on November 23, 1999, 
Walsey filed 
a corporate derivative suit against Warner and AHP in the same court.  The 
two 
complaints both arise from the merger agreement between Warner and AHP, 
contain the 
same facts and allegations, and rely exclusively upon Delaware law. 
The shareholders' complaint alleges that Warner directors initially 
refused to 
pursue serious merger discussions with Pfizer in violation of their 
fiduciary obligation to 
Warner's shareholders.  The alleged breach is based upon their reluctance 
to pursue 
Pfizer's substantially higher offer.  According to the averments, Pfizer 
attempted merger 
discussions with Warner on three previous occasions, but the Warner 
directors simply 
refused to entertain the possibility.   The complaints also claim that 
Warner breached its 
fiduciary duty by agreeing to pay AHP the $2 billion break-up fee.   
In addition to the federal suits, other Warner shareholders also began 
filing suits 
against Warner in state court in Delaware.  To date, over 30 shareholder 
class action suits 
are pending in the Delaware courts as well as one derivative action.  The 
Delaware suits 
were consolidated into Rosman v. De Vink, C.A. No. 17519-NC.  The Delaware 
litigation is based upon the same allegations and requests the same relief 
as the Walsey 
and McMurray actions.  
Warner and AHP filed motions asking the district court to abstain in favor 
of the 
litigation in Delaware state court, or in the alternative, to stay the 
proceedings while the 
Delaware litigation was pending.  The district court refused to abstain, 
but issued an 
order "granting a stay and administratively terminating these cases."  
McMurray and 
Walsey filed a motion for reconsideration, which the district court 
denied.  This appeal 
followed. 
                         II.  Discussion 
                        A.  Jurisdiction 
Preliminarily, Warner and AHP argue that the district court's stay was not 
a final 
order under 28 U.S.C.  1291, and that we therefore have no jurisdiction.  
However, that 
issue has already been resolved by the Supreme Court.  In Moses H. Cone 
Memorial 
Hosp. v Mercury Construction, Corp. 460 U.S. 1 (1983),  the district court 
stayed federal 
litigation in favor of parallel proceedings in state court, and the 
propriety of that stay was 
challenged on appeal.  In analyzing the jurisdictional issue, the Supreme 
Court concluded 
that "a stay of the federal suit pending resolution of the state suit 
meant that there would 
be no further litigation in the federal forum; the state court's judgment 
on the issue 
would be res judicata."  460 U.S. at 10.  The Court held that the stay was 
therefore 
equivalent to a dismissal because the defendant was "effectively out of 
[federal] court."  
Id.  at 10, 13.   
We have previously held that the pertinent jurisdictional inquiry under 
Moses H. 
Cone is whether the district court has surrendered its jurisdiction to the 
state court such 
that the stay will have res judicata effect in subsequent litigation in 
state court.  See 
Spring City Corp. v. Am. Buildings Co., 193 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 1999).  
If it has that 
effect, the order staying the federal litigation is final and appealable.  
Id.  
Here, the issues raised in the Delaware litigation will be res judicata 
for purposes 
of the federal adjudication. The defendants in the state and federal suits 
are the same, and 
plaintiffs Walsey and McMurray are represented in the Delaware shareholder 
action. 
Warner Br. at 6.  Thus, a decision on the merits in state court will have 
a preclusive 
effect on the stayed federal case, putting the shareholders "effectively 
out of [federal] 
court."  See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10.  The stay is therefore a final 
order that is 
reviewable under  1291.  
                          B.  The Stay 
The shareholders contend that the district court applied the wrong legal 
standard 
in granting the stay.  They insist that the abstention that resulted from 
the district court's 
order is inconsistent with Colorado River and its progeny, and that the 
stay was, 
therefore, an abuse of discretion. 
Colorado River involved the application of the McCarran Amendment, 43 
U.S.C. 
 666, which waives the federal government's sovereign immunity in water 
rights cases 
and permits the United States to be joined in state suits involving those 
rights.  The 
United States had filed suit in federal district court seeking a 
declaration of certain water 
rights.  Shortly thereafter, one of the defendants in that declaratory 
action brought an 
action against the United States in state court in an effort to adjudicate 
both state and 
federal claims pursuant to the provisions of the McCarran Amendment. 
Several of the 
defendants in the federal action then attempted to dismiss the federal 
suit arguing that the 
federal court lacked jurisdiction under the McCarran Amendment.  The 
district court 
never decided the jurisdictional issue, but did abstain in favor of the 
ongoing state 
actions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in an appeal from that 
abstention "to 
consider whether the McCarran Amendment terminated jurisdiction of federal 
courts to 
adjudicate federal water rights and whether, if that jurisdiction was not 
terminated, the 
District Court's dismissal was nevertheless appropriate." Colorado River, 
424 U.S. at 
806.   
The Supreme Court affirmed largely because of the federal policy reflected 
in the 
McCarran Amendment.  "The clear federal policy evinced by that legislation 
is the 
avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system.  
This policy is akin 
to that underlying the rule requiring that jurisdiction be yielded to the 
court first 
acquiring control of property."  Id. at 819. The Court reasoned that the 
policy against 
piecemeal litigation reflected Congress' assessment that state courts and 
state 
administrators had more expertise in adjudicating water rights than 
federal courts.  See 
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 16.  
The Court considered four factors in determining if abstention was 
warranted: 1) 
which forum first assumed jurisdiction over the property at issue, 2) the 
inconvenience of 
the federal forum, 3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation, 
and 4) the order in 
which jurisdiction was obtained in the concurrent forums.  Colorado River, 
424 U.S. at 
818.  In doing so, however, the Court stressed that "no one factor is 
necessarily 
determinative." Rather, the combination of these factors must be balanced 
against "the 
obligation to exercise jurisdiction . . .". Id.  Once the balancing is 
completed, "[o]nly the 
clearest of justifications will warrant dismissal [in favor of the 
concurrent state 
litigation]."  Id. at 818-19.   
In Moses H. Cone, supra, the Court identified two additional factors that 
must be 
considered.  These additional considerations require the trial court to 
weigh: which 
forum's law provides the rule of decision, and the adequacy of the state 
proceeding in 
protecting the parties' rights.  Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 23, 26. 
Here, the district court correctly noted that Colorado River states that a 
court may 
abstain only in extremely limited circumstances.  However, the court then 
proceeded to 
make a distinction between abstaining and granting a stay. See A-1, Letter 
Opinion dated 
October 26, 2000 at 2.  The court concluded that our discussion of 
Colorado River in 
Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 1997) furnished the most recent 
pronouncement 
on the law of abstention.  However, the court then relied upon several 
factors enunciated 
in Tabas v. Mullane, 608 F. Supp. 759, 763 (D.N.J. 1985) in holding that a 
stay was 
appropriate here even though it also held that abstention was not.   See 
Letter Op. at 2.   
Compared with other forms of abstention, like Pullman, where a court is 
required 
to dismiss the case, the Supreme Court expressly left open the question 
whether a federal 
court should dismiss or stay its proceedings when ordering abstention 
because of 
duplicative state court litigation.  In Moses H. Cone, the Court stated:  
          [w]e have no occasion . . . to decide whether a 
          dismissal or stay should ordinarily be the preferred course of 
          action when a district court properly finds that 
          Colorado River counsels in favor of deferring to a parallel 
          state-court suit.  We can say, however, that a stay is as much a 
          refusal to exercise federal jurisdiction as a dismissal.  When a 
          district court decides to dismiss or stay under Colorado River, 
          it presumably concludes that the parallel state-court litigation 
          will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt 
          resolution of the issues between the parties. 
           
Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 28.  Thus, the District Court erred in 
concluding that, by 
staying the case, it was not abstaining.  The stay that was entered is 
nothing more than 
the procedural mechanism for abstaining in favor of the concurrent state 
litigation.  
We reject any notion that Tabas could properly establish a separate test 
for 
abstention. The relevant inquiry must be guided by Colorado River and its 
progeny, not 
Tabas, or principles extrapolated from it.  We therefore reject any 
suggestion that Tabas 
furnishes an analytical framework for a stay distinct from Colorado River.  
It is well established in this Circuit that Colorado River governs motions 
to 
dismiss on grounds of abstention.  See, e.g., Ryan, 115 F.3d at 196 
(applying Colorado 
River to the motion to dismiss); Ingersoll-Rand, Corp. v. Callison, 844 
F.2d 133, 137 (3d 
Cir. 1988) (same); Western Auto Supply Co. v. Anderson, 610 F.2d 1126, 
1127 (3d Cir. 
1979) (same).  We have consistently emphasized the narrowness of Colorado 
River, and 
stressed that a federal court is usually statutorily obligated to exercise 
the jurisdiction that 
Congress has bestowed.  See Western Auto, 610 F.2d at 1127 (citing 
Colorado River and 
Calvert Fire as emphasizing a court's "unflagging obligation" to exercise 
jurisdiction); 
see Kentucky W. Virginia Gas Co. v. Penn. Public Utility Comm'n, 791 F.2d 
1111, 1118 
(3d Cir. 1986) (noting in dicta that the movant did not meet the Colorado 
River 
standards as there had been no showing of any congressional legislation 
evincing an 
intent to circumscribe the plaintiff's right to choose the federal forum).  
In Ryan, we reversed a district court's decision to abstain and dismiss an 
action in 
favor of state litigation largely because there was no clear congressional 
policy against 
piecemeal litigation that would have counseled in favor of abstention.  
See Ryan, 115 
F.3d at 199.  Ryan was a negligence suit involving state tort law.  We 
stated that "[t]he 
presence of garden-variety state law issues has not, in this circuit, been 
considered 
sufficient evidence of a congressional policy to consolidate multiple 
lawsuits for unified 
resolution in the state courts."  Id. at 198.  We also cautioned that if 
the presence of 
concurrent litigation itself becomes the threshold test for meeting 
Colorado River's 
piecemeal litigation factor, then "the test becomes so broad that it 
swallows up the 
century-old principle . . . that the pendency of an action in the state 
court is no bar to 
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having 
jurisdiction . . . ."  
Id. (quoting Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817) (internal quotations 
omitted).  That is 
precisely the situation here. 
We reaffirmed Ryan, supra, in Spring City Corp.  In Spring City, we 
concluded 
that no "exceptional circumstances" warranted a stay.  Our decision 
focused in large part 
upon the narrowness of the Colorado River doctrine as exemplified by its 
requirement of 
a clear federal policy against piecemeal litigation. We again noted that 
such a policy is a 
prime consideration in any attempt to overcome a federal court's 
obligation to exercise 
jurisdiction.  See Spring City, 193 F.3d at 172.  We also explicitly 
stated that "Ryan 
represents the applicable law under Third Circuit and Supreme Court 
precedent" 
regarding abstention.  Id.      
We perceive no distinction between the circumstances here, and the 
circumstances 
that were insufficient to justify abstention in Ryan.  In fact, only the 
fourth Colorado 
River factor--the order in which jurisdiction was obtained--weighs in 
favor of abstention 
here.  That factor does not turn upon "which complaint is filed first, but 
rather [on]. . . 
how much progress has been made in the two actions."  Moses H. Cone, 460 
U.S. at 21.  
We are advised without contradiction that 
          the Delaware Litigation proceeded on an expedited schedule. 
          . . . [T]he plaintiffs in the Delaware Litigation moved with 
          expedition. Court conferences were held; voluminous 
          documents were requested and produced; interrogatories 
          propounded, objected to and answered; and some twenty 
          depositions were taken. The Court of Chancery ruled upon 
          multiple discovery and scheduling issues. Indeed, discovery 
          in the Delaware Litigation is largely, if not altogether, 
          complete. 
 
Warner Br. at 7. This does not weigh heavily in the balance however, given 
our 
consideration of all of the other Colorado River/Moses H. Cone factors and 
the absence 
of a federal policy against piecemeal litigation that was so important to 
our inquiry in 
Ryan. 
There has been no assumption of jurisdiction over property here so that is 
not 
relevant to our analysis. The federal district court is situated in 
Newark, New Jersey. That 
forum is not inconvenient as both Warner and AHP have their principle 
place of business 
in New Jersey.  Moreover, New Jersey and Delaware are neighboring states.  
Even if we 
were to assume that the participants must travel to New Jersey from the 
most distant part 
of Delaware, we would be hard put to define the resultant travel as 
imposing such a 
hardship that a federal court in New Jersey would be inconvenient for 
purposes of 
Colorado River. In addition, there is no credible allegation that this 
litigation involves 
anything more than garden-variety state corporate law issues.   
Appellees seize upon the fact that the issues here are controlled by 
Delaware law, 
and they remind us of the expertise of Delaware courts in resolving issues 
of corporate 
law and shareholders' rights.  We share the appellees' high regard for the 
courts and 
jurists of Delaware, and we are well aware of the unique stature of 
corporate law in 
Delaware.  However, that is not a sufficient reason for a federal court to 
refrain from 
exercising its jurisdiction.  
Moreover, "while the presence of federal issues militates against 
abstention, the 
converse cannot be said; abstention cannot be justified merely because a 
case arises 
entirely under state law."  Ryan, 115 F.3d at 199; see also Spring City, 
193 F.3d at 172.  
Furthermore, application of state law is not as important where, as here, 
the federal 
forum is adequate to protect the parties' rights. It is a far more 
important consideration 
when the state court is an inadequate forum to protect the rights of the 
litigants.  See 
Ryan, 115 F.3d at 200; Spring City, 193 F.3d at 172.  
Given the parameters of Colorado River and Ryan, it is clear that the 
district court 
abused its discretion in staying this litigation.  It is ironic that the 
district court explained 
the "alternative" relief here by stating: "[a]bstention would be an 
extreme and 
inappropriate response.  But a stay meets the proper concerns raised by 
the defendants, 
and the motion for that relief is granted." A-3.  However, as we stated 
above, here there 
is no distinction between abstaining from adjudicating the federal 
litigation on the one 
hand, and staying it on the other.  We therefore hold that the district 
court abused its 
discretion by entering the stay.  
                         III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will vacate the district court's order 
and 
remand for further proceedings on the merits.       
 
     
TO THE COURT: 
     Please file the foregoing opinion. 
                                                                      By 
the Court, 
                                                                       
                                                                                                            
                                                                      
CIRCUIT JUDGE
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                            JUDGMENT 
                                 
     This cause came to be considered on appeal from the United States 
District Court 
for the District of New Jersey, and was argued on November 7, 2001.  
     On consideration whereon, it is now ORDERED AND ADJUDGED by this 
Court 
that the order of the stay entered by the District Court is hereby 
vacated, and the matter is 
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the 
attached opinion.  
                                   ATTEST: 
 
                                   CLERK 
 
 
DATED January 3, 2002     
